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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER
PITTSBURGH & LAKE ERIE RAILROAD v.
RAIL WAY LABOR EXECUTIVES'
ASSOCIATION THE MOVEMENT
TO A COMPETITIVE
RAILROAD INDUSTRY*
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress broad power to
regulate commerce among the states.' Pursuant to this authority, Congress
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) in the late nineteenth century,
establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) to regulate
interstate commerce. 2 The Commission has the authority to regulate all
modes of transportation carrying passengers and freight across state boundaries.3 Since the enactment of the ICA, the Commission has regulated the
railroad industry.4 Congress adopted legislation subsequent to the ICA that
increased regulatory constraints on the railroad industry and demonstrated
the importance Congress attached to developing and maintaining an efficient
interstate railroad system.'
* First Place, John H. Fanning Labor Law Writing Competition, Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, 1990.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This grant of power must be read together with the
necessary and proper clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
2. See generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1982).
3. Id. § 10501(a). The Commission has jurisdiction over interstate transportation:
(1) by rail carrier, express carrier, sleeping car carrier, water common carrier, and
pipeline carrier that is(A) only by railroad;
(B) by railroad and water, when the transportation is under common control,
management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment; or
(C) by pipeline or by pipeline and railroad or water when transporting a commodity other than water, gas, or oil.
Id. § 10501(a)(1)(A)-(C).
4. "The declared policy of [the ICA] was to promote economical and efficient transportation services at reasonable charges .... " Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 352 (1960) (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1982) (denying a
federal court jurisdiction to issue an injunction against a strike in a labor dispute); Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982) (regulating employment relationships in the railroad
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Prior to the adoption of the ICA, railroads enjoyed a near monopoly over
interstate transportation.6 With the enactment of the ICA, however, and the
development of more efficient and economical means of interstate transportation, such as trucking and barge, the railroad industry suffered from increased competition in the transportation market.7 The fact that the
railroad industry remained regulated while the trucking and barge industries
were deregulated magnified the effect of this increased competition.'
industry). These acts, together with the ICA, provide comprehensive "regulation of railroads,
their transportation services and their employer-employee relations." Order of R.R. Telegrapherm 362 U.S. at 352 (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
6. Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1979) [hereinafter Railroad Deregulation Act Hearings] (statement of Brock Adams, Secretary, Department of Transportation); see also H.R. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980). During
this time, railroads carried over 90% of the inter-city freight and passenger traffic. Address by
R.L. Banks, President, R.L. Banks & Assoc., Western Coal Transportation Association Meeting and Conference (Sept. 1988) (transcript at 124) [hereinafter Address].
Railroads were able to charge high rates because shippers were dependent on railroads to
move their goods. See Railroads 1975: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 618 (1975) [hereinafter, Railroads 1975: Hearings] (statement of William T.
Coleman, Jr., Secretary, Department of Transportation).
The railroads "had an effective monopoly. All commerce was the captive shipper. And...
the railroads took advantage of their natural monopoly, and they extracted what made some
captive shippers feel was an actual tribute undue and unnecessary. And moreover, they neglected to provide adequate service to a lot of shippers." Address, supra, at 124.
7. See Railroads 1975: Hearings, supra note 6, at 619. When the Commission was
formed, the railroad, in many cases, was the only mode of transportation available to
merchants and shippers. Id at 618. By 1975, however, Secretary Coleman had concluded
that:
Protection against rail monopoly should no longer be the main focus of regulation.
Sadly, the regulatory system has not kept pace with the economic development of
transportation and the competition in transportation. Rather than protecting shippers from the exercise of rail monopoly, the current regulatory system keeps railroads from effectively competing for the kind of traffic they can best handle.
Id. at 619; see Railroad Deregulation Act Hearings, supra note 6, at 62; see also 104 CONG.
REC. 10,837 (1958).
By 1975, the conditions of the railroads were deplorable. Railroads 1975: Hearings, supra
note 6, at 617. For example, many of the railroad tracks were in such poor condition that
standing trains would derail. Id Often, trains operating on mainline track could not run
faster than ten miles per hour. Id
8. Railroad Deregulation Act Hearings, supra note 6, at 68. By 1977, 92% of the water
carrier industry was deregulated and 60% of the trucking industry was deregulated. Id.
Other reasons for the railroad's decline included the movement of the population into the
sunbelt, the decreasing demand for coal as a fuel, and the development of the federal interstate
highway system which led to a decrease in the need for passenger service. Address, supra note
6, at 128. Much of the freight "carried by other modes [of transportation] could be carried
faster, or less circuitously, or at lower cost by the railroads." Railroad Deregulation Act Hearings, supra note 6, at 68. Nevertheless, "the regulatory system continues to inhibit the railroads from competing effectively for this traffic." Id
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Faced with an uneconomical and inefficient railroad industry, Congress
amended the ICA by adopting statutory reforms aimed at revitalizing the
railroad industry.9 The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
(Railroad Revitalization Act) allowed rail carriers ° to earn a greater return
on their investment while limiting the Commission's jurisdiction to those
situations where a rail carrier dominated the transportation market." The
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (Staggers Act) continued many of the regulatory
changes started under the Railroad Revitalization Act. In particular, the

Staggers Act increased rail carriers' flexibility in acquiring rail lines by
granting the Commission the authority to implement regulations streamlin-

ing the regulatory process.

2

One of the unexpected results of Congress' deregulation efforts was the
growth of shortline railroads.1 3 In 1986, the Commission, pursuant to its
authority under the Staggers Act, adopted procedures to exempt many
9. See Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat.
31 (1976); Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
10. A carrier includes common carriers such as rail carriers. 48 U.S.C. § 10102(2) & (4)
(1982). A rail carrier is defined as "a person providing railroad transportation for compensation." Id. § 10102(19).
11. See J. HELLER, COAL TRANSPORTATION AND DEREGULATION: AN IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE STAGGERS ACT 6 (1983); see also S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976)
(setting forth the purposes behind the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act).
12. J. HELLER, supra note 11, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No. 1430, supra note 6, at 80,
reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4110, 4111 (implying that one of the
goals of the Staggers Act was to provide a more efficient and streamlined regulatory process).
13. Short Line and Regional R.R.: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Surface
Transp. of the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 547 (1987)
[hereinafter Short Line Hearings] (statement of Heather Gradison, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission). In 1981, sixteen shortlines were established; in 1984, thirty shortlines
were established; in 1986, forty-one shortlines were established. Rapid Growth of Short-Line
and Regional R.R.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism, and Hazardous
Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1987)
[hereinafter Rapid Growth Hearings] (statement of Heather J. Gradison, Chairman, Interstate
Commerce Commission). While no precise definition of shortlines exists, shortlines are generally considered to be railroads with annual revenues below seventeen million dollars (also
known as class III railroads). Id. at 71. Shortline railroads covered 7,591 miles in 1987. Id at
75.
Many shortlines are created when the large rail carriers abandon the less profitable branch
lines. Short Line Hearings,supra, at 17. Shortlines are generally profitable because they have
a stable traffic base, low labor costs and greater labor productivity. Rapid Growth Hearings,
supra, at 83; see also Short Line Hearings,supra at 87 (statement of O.M. Berge, Chairman of
the Railway Labor Executives' Association, indicating that shortlines are created primarily at
the expense of the employees).
Flexibility in work assignments is a crucial factor in reducing costs for shortline railroads.
Short Line Hearings,supra, at 17. Many of the smaller shortlines employ part-time labor, or
utilize their managerial and sales staff in labor positions, thereby reducing the total workforce.

Id.
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shortline acquisitions from the formal approval process established under
the ICA. 14 The adoption of the exemption procedures, together with the
Commission's continuing effort to create a more competitive railroad industry, created tension between railroad management and railroad labor unions." s This tension developed from the Commission's reduction in
regulations governing railroad acquisitions and Congress' continued regula16
tion of railroad labor relationships under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).
Consequently, the railroads gained some flexibility in acquiring rail lines, yet
they were still required to bargain with the labor 17unions before implementing changes that might affect railroad employees.
The Supreme Court confronted the tension between the relaxed regulatory
environment for acquisitions'" and the continued regulatory structure governing railroad employers in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association. 9 In this case, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether the RLA's bargaining provisions applied when railroad management sought to utilize the Commission's new procedures exempting management from the ICA's formal approval requirements when
selling its railroad assets.2' The Court ruled that the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
Railroad (P&LE) was under no obligation to bargain with the employees'
unions.2 ' The Court based its decision on the fact that the terms of the sale
were settled at the time the unions notified P&LE of their intent to bargain
with P&LE regarding both the decision to sell and the effects of the sale on
P&LE's employees.2 2
14. See infra note 39. Acquisitions are exempted provided that these transactions do not
interfere with the national transportation policy. See Short Line Hearings,supra note 13, at 18
(stating that the reason for the exemption provision was the Commission's recognition that
shortlines must act rapidly when completing a purchase in order "to take advantage of

favorable financing and to ensure uninterrupted service").
15. Address, supra note 6, at 135-36.
16. The RLA, enacted in 1926, sets forth a comprehensive set of procedures that railroad
management must follow when changing employees' wages, rules or working conditions. 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1982). See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text (discussing the bargaining provisions of the RLA).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 64-79 (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of working conditions which trigger the RLA's bargaining provisions).
18. The Pittsburgh & Lake Erie decision is limited to the acquisitions of railroads, therefore, this Note will focus only on the acquisition of a railroad under the Staggers Act amendments to the ICA.
19. 109 S.Ct. 2584 (1989).
20. Id. at 2592.
21. Id. at 2597.

22. Id. A secondary issue in this case was whether the circuit court of appeals correctly
set aside the injunction against the strike. The Supreme Court, however, determined that the
record was insufficient to determine this issue and remanded the issue to the court of appeals.
Id. at 2598-99.
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In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the railroad needed to sell its assets to satisfy
debts.2 3 P&LE's labor unions argued that the sale, and the subsequent loss
of 500 jobs, which affected the working conditions of P&LE's employees,
triggered the RLA's bargaining provisions. 24 P&LE, however, argued that
the RLA's bargaining provisions did not apply because the railroad was selling to a noncarrier.25 Instead, P&LE asserted that the sale was complete
once the exemption filed with the Commission became effective. 26
Writing for the majority, Justice White analyzed the conflict between the
RLA and the ICA by focusing on P&LE's duties under the RLA, 27 rather
than by examining whether the ICA's requirements would preempt the
RLA. 28 The majority decided that the RLA did not require P&LE to notify
the unions of the proposed sale. 29 Moreover, under the majority's analysis,
the filing of the union's notice to change the collective bargaining agreements to include labor protection provisions did not obligate P&LE to refrain from selling the railroad. The majority reasoned that by the time the
unions filed the notice, the terms of the sale were settled.30 Nevertheless, the
majority concluded that P&LE was required to bargain with the unions
about those demands which P&LE could settle, without imposing labor protection provisions on the noncarrier buyer.31
Writing for the dissent,3 2 Justice Stevens focused on the regulated railroad
industry's unique position in the American economy. 33 The dissent maintained that the railroad, as a regulated utility, did not have the same freedom
to enter or leave the transportation market as nonregulated businesses enjoy.34 The dissent also noted that before going out of business, a railroad
must first obtain Commission approval.3 5 According to the dissent, however, this approval does not diminish management's duty under the RLA to
bargain with the unions. 36 Thus, the dissent concluded that P&LE violated
23. Id. at 2588; see infra text accompanying notes 145-67 (discussing majority opinion in
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie).
24. Id. at 2588.
25. Id. at 2589, 2591.

26. Id. at 2589.
27. Id. at 2597.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

32. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' dissent. Id. at 2599
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2600-02.
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its duty to bargain under the RLA by refusing to negotiate with the unions
over the proposed sale.
Part I of this Note examines the ICA's exemption procedures in light of
the recent trend toward deregulation of the railroad industry. This section
then focuses on the RLA's bargaining provisions and how Congress and the
Supreme Court have interpreted the term "working conditions" under the
RLA. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's interpretation of management's
prerogative to go out of business as developed in nonregulated industries and
applied to the railroad industry. Part III examines the decision in Pittsburgh
and Lake Erie and determines whether, in light of prior law, railroad management should unilaterally be allowed to decide when to go out of business.
Finally, this Note concludes that Congress must amend the legislation governing railroad labor relationships to enable railroads to function in a competitive transportation market.
I.

REGULATING THE RAILROAD:

AN UPDATED INTERSTATE

COMMERCE ACT CONFRONTS THE ANTIQUATED RAILWAY

LABOR ACT

A. The Interstate Commerce Act: Restructuringthe RailroadIndustry
The ICA requires the Commission to carry out the nation's rail transportation policy when exercising its regulatory power over the railroad industry." In balancing the labor protection provisions of the transportation
policy against the need to develop and maintain a competitive railroad industry, Congress granted the Commission the authority to control the acquisition of railroad lines.38 The ICA establishes detailed procedures for
37. 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1982); see supra notes 3-4; see also 49 U.S.C. § 1010la(l)-(15)
(setting forth the rail transportation policy). The rail transportation policy insures that the
Commission, when involved in regulating rail carriers and other modes of transportation, seeks
to preserve competition among the various modes of transportation; promotes safe, efficient
transportation; encourages sound economic conditions both in transportation and among carriers; establishes and maintains reasonable rates without unreasonable discrimination or unfair
competition; cooperates with state and local officials on transportation matters; and encourages "fair wages and safe and suitable working conditions in the railroad industry." Id
38. 49 U.S.C. § 10901(a)(3); see 104 CONG. REc. 12,526 (1958) (statement of Rep.
Springer that the purpose of the 1958 ICA amendments was to "strengthen and improve our
Nation's railroad transportation system so that it may better fulfill its complete role in meeting
the transportation needs of the Nation's expanding economy and the requirements of national
defense"); see also 77 CONG. REC. 4879 (1933) (statement of Rep. Huddleston that the "interests of railroad labor and of the owners of the railroads, while important, are but secondary;
the primary interest is that of the general public").
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interstate rail carriers to follow when acquiring rail lines. 39 In determining
whether to permit an acquisition, the Commission must weigh the rail transportation policy considerations and decide whether labor protection provisions should be imposed on railroad management. Labor protection
provisions may be implemented only if the Commission finds that these provisions are necessary to protect the interests of a railroad's employees. 4'
Due to the ICA's complex and time consuming procedures, which a business involved in rail transportation must comply with when acquiring a railroad, Congress amended the ICA to allow the Commission to exempt
acquiring rail carriers and noncarriers from these procedures. 4 1 In particu39. 49 U.S.C. § 10901 (1982). The procedures outlined in section 10901 provide that the
rail carrier shall submit an application to the Commission. Id. § 10901(b). This section provides, in relevant part, that once the Commission receives the application it must:
1) send a copy of the application to the chief executive officer of each State that
would be directly affected by the construction or operation of the railroad line;
2) send an accurate and understandable summary of the application to a newspaper
of general circulation in each area that would be affected by the construction or
operation of the railroad line;
3) have a copy of the summary published in the Federal Register;
4) take other reasonable and effective steps to publicize the application; and
5) indicate in each transmission and publication that each interested person is entitled to recommend to the Commission that it approve, deny, or take action concerning the application.

Id. § 10901(bXl)-(5).
If the Commission finds that public convenience and necessity warrant proceeding with the
rail application, then it may either approve the application as filed or modify the application.
Id. § 10901(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Failure to find public convenience and necessity may result in the
Commission denying the application. Id. § 10901(c)(I)(B). If the application is approved, the
Commission shall issue a certificate to the rail carrier describing the acquisition approved. Id.

§ 1090 1(c)(2).
40. In a series of cases, the Commission determined that it would not impose labor provisions on the acquisition of rail lines by noncarriers. See Ex Parte No. 392, Application Procedures for a Certificate to Construct, Acquire or Operate R.R. Lines, 365 I.C.C. 516 (1982)
[hereinafter Ex ParteNo. 392] aff'd sub nom. Simmons v. ICC, 829 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(determining that labor protective conditions do not have to be imposed when a carrier
purchases a line from a noncarrier); Prairie Trunk Ry., 348 I.C.C. 832 (1977), aff'd sub nom
Illinois v. United States, 604 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1979) (imposition of labor protective conditions is discretionary, however, under the section of the ICA governing extensions or abandonment of rail lines). Labor protection provisions shall be provided when abandoning or
discontinuing operation of a rail line. Ex Parte No. 392, supra, at 516.
41. 49 U.S.C. § 10505. Congress' findings surrounding the adoption of the Staggers Act
concluded that many of the regulations affecting railroads were "unnecessary and inefficient."
H.R. REP. No. 1430, supra note 6, at 3. Moreover, railroads were unable to earn enough to
generate the necessary funds for financing capital improvements. Id.
Under the regulations implementing the Staggers Act, the exemption applies to the
following:
(1) Acquisition by a noncarrier of rail property that would be operated by a third
party;
(2) Operation by a new carrier of rail property acquired by a third party;
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lar, Congress mandated that the Commission exempt parties from the procedures when compliance with the formal approval procedures is not necessary
in order to carry out the rail transportation policy.42 Furthermore, the
Commission will allow the exemption to become effective only if the Commission finds that the acquisition is either of "limited scope," 4 3 or that adherence to the procedures is not needed to "protect shippers from abuse of
market power."' Accordingly, the Commission may not use the exemption
power to release management from its duty to protect the interests of a railroad's employees.45
Although the Commission has discretion to impose labor protections on
employees affected by an acquisition, it has refused to impose them.16 Generally, the Commission takes the position that the imposition of labor protections discourages the type of acquisitions that Congress determined
should be encouraged.47 Therefore, absent a demonstrated need, the Com(3) A change in operators on the line; and
(4) Acquisition of incidental trackage rights. Incidental trackage rights include the
grant of trackage rights by the seller, or the assignment of trackage rights to
operate over the line of a third party that occur at the time of the exempt acquisition or operation.
49 C.F.R. § 1150.31(a)(l)-(4) (1989).
42. 49 U.S.C. § 10505(a)(1). The Commission's regulations implementing the exemption
procedure set forth the method that a rail carrier or noncarrier must follow in order to obtain
the exemption. The applicant must file a notice with the Commission providing details of the
acquisition. 49 C.F.R. § 1150.32(a). Under the regulations, the exemption becomes effective
seven days after the notice is filed. 49 C.F.R. § 1150.32(b). Parties affected by the acquisition
may petition the Commission to revoke the exemption. Ex Parte No. 392 (Sub-No. 1), Class
Exemption for the Acquisition and Operation of Rail Lines Under 49 U.S.C. § 10901, 1 I.C.C.
2d 810, 812 (1985) [hereinafter Ex Parte No. 392 (Sub-No. 1)]. The Commission will revoke
the exemption if the parties are successful in showing that regulation of the acquisition is
necessary to carry out the rail transportation policy. 49 U.S.C. § 10505(d).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 10505(a)(2)(A).
44. Id. § 10505(a)(2)(B). The Staggers Act "permits exemptions wherever regulation is
not needed to prevent abuses of market power, regardless of the presence of effective competition." H.R. REP. No. 1430, supra note 6, at 105, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4110, 4137.

45. 49 U.S.C. § 10505(g)(2).
46. See Ex Parte 392 (Sub-No. 1), supra note 42, at 813; see also 49 U.S.C. § 10901(e)
(stating that the Commission may impose labor protection provisions on railroad employees.).
47. Ex Parte 392 (Sub-No. 1), supra note 42, at 813-14. Congressional intent reflects a
desire for "discretionary" rather than mandatory labor protection under section 10901. H.R.
REP. No. 1430, supra note 6, at 116, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

4110, 4148. The labor representatives believed that the Commission would use this discretion
in favor of imposing protection except in a few situations. Staggers Rail Act: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transp. and Tourism, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1986) [hereinafter Staggers Hearings] (statement of the Railway Labor
Executives' Association (RLEA)). Prior to the implementation of Ex Parte 392 (Sub-No. 1),
the Commission generally exercised its discretion in favor of labor protections. Id. at 54.
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mission has stated that the imposition of labor protections will render acquisitions more costly and, consequently, inhibit the completion of the
transactions.48
B.

The Railway Labor Act: A Remnant of RailroadRegulation

The Commission's refusal to impose labor protections since the implementation of the Staggers Act amendments has forced a confrontation with the
RLA's provisions and policies.49 Congress enacted the RLA to prevent disputes between railroads and railroad employees from disrupting interstate
commerce. 5 ° The passage of the RLA demonstrated Congress' determination that railroad employees be given "separate treatment" distinct from employees of other organized industries."' The RLA's provisions seek to
encourage settlement of disputes, while imposing on both parties the obligation not to change the status quo (the status quo provision) by resorting to
self-help remedies, such as labor strikes, until the parties exhaust the RLA's
bargaining procedures.52 After exhaustion, however, both parties can use
self-help remedies.5 3
48. Ex Parte 392 (Sub-No. 1), supra note 42, at 813-14.
49. See Staggers Hearings,supra note 47, at 57, 67. The RLEA believed that the Commission chose not to impose labor protections, unless required to do so, because these protections
hinder the railroads' competitive ability. Id. at 67.
50. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982). The purposes of the RLA are enumerated in section 151a as
follows:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein;
(2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any
denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to
join a labor organization;
(3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the
matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter;
(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions;
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
Id.
51. S.REP. No. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1963). The Labor Management Relations
Act and other acts governing labor-management disputes (such as the National Labor Relations Act) generally do not apply to railroad labor disuptes. Id. at 7.
52. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150 (1969).
The procedures of the RLA are "purposely long and drawn out based on the hope that reason
and practical considerations will provide, in time, an agreement that resolves the dispute." Id.
at 149; see Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks Freight Handlers v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384
U.S. 238, 246 (1966) (citing the same); see also 45 U.S.C. § 152 first (delineating the general
duties of carriers and employees).
53. See Shore Line 396 U.S. at 149 (stating that the status quo provision imposes "upon
the parties an obligation to make every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement and to re-
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The status quo provision 4 is one of the key provisions of the RLA. This
provision encourages the parties involved in a railroad labor dispute to negotiate before utilizing self-help remedies.55 Under the RLA's status quo provision, neither management nor the labor unions can change employees'
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions until the RLA's bargaining provisions are met.56 The RLA requires the party seeking to make a change to
give written notice to the other party at least thirty days prior to the proposed change." The RLA also mandates that the party seeking to make a
change provide an opportunity to bargain with the other party about the
change.5" Once this written notice, known as a section 156 notice," is issued, the proposed change cannot be implemented until an agreement is
reached, or until negotiations are terminated.6 If the parties cannot reach
an agreement, they may request the services of the National Mediation
Board (the Board) which conducts an investigation and issues a report.61 If
frain from altering the status quo by resorting to self-help while the Act's remedies [are] being
exhausted").
54. 45 U.S.C. § 152 seventh. This provision provides: "No carrier, its officers or agents
shall change the rates of pay, rules or working conditions of its employees as a class, as embodied in agreement except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this
title." Id.
55. The immediate effect of the status quo provision is to "prevent the union from striking
and management from doing anything that would justify a strike." Shore Line, 396 U.S. at
150. Maintaining the status quo during an investigation is "absolutely indispensable to any
proper consideration of the controversy." 67 CONG. REC. 4648 (1926).
56. 45 U.S.C. § 152 seventh. The RLA also imposes a duty on all railroads and their
employees to:
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of
the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the
carrier and the employees thereof.
Id. § 152 first.
The status quo provision "extends to those actual, objective working conditions out of which
the dispute arose." Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 153.
57. 45 U.S.C. § 156.
58. Id.
59. Throughout this Note the term "section 156 notice" will refer to the notice required
from carriers or representatives of railroad employees before either party implements a change
affecting the rates of pay, rules or working conditions. Although the original bill refers to this
notice as a section 6 notice, the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie refers to the notice
as a section 156 notice. 109 S.Ct. 2584, 2589 (1989); see Railway Labor Act, ch. 347 § 6, 44
Stat. 582 (1926).
60. 45 U.S.C. § 156. Negotiations are terminated when ten days have passed since the
conclusion of negotiations and there has been no request for intervention by the Board. Id.
61. Id. After the section 156 notice is filed, the parties must confer in an attempt to reach
an agreement. Id. If the parties fail to come to an agreement during the conference, they may
request the aid of the Board. Id. § 154.
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the Board cannot settle the dispute, and the dispute threatens to "substantially interfere with interstate commerce," the President may appoint an
emergency board to investigate the dispute.62 Only after the parties exhaust
these procedures may they resort to labor strikes or other self-help
remedies.63
Although an attempt to change railroad employees' working conditions
triggers the status quo provision of the RLA," the RLA does not define the
term "working conditions." In fact, the legislative debates surrounding the
adoption of the RLA do not provide a definition. One union representative,
testifying during the hearings on the RLA,65 stated that he understood the
term "working conditions" to refer to those exact conditions existing at the
time the dispute arose, including, but not limited to, the payment of wages
and employment relations.6 6
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "working conditions" has been
consistent with the union representative's understanding as articulated at the
RLA hearings. In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,67 the Court determined that job security was a working condition within the meaning of the RLA because the affected employees were
covered by collective bargaining agreements.68 In Railroad Telegraphers,
the Chicago & North Western Railroad sought to abolish some stations, and
consequently reduce the railroad's workforce, because the railroad had determined that maintaining those stations was no longer profitable. 69 The
labor unions filed a section 156 notice requesting an amendment to the existing collective bargaining agreements which would prevent the elimination
of any positions without the union's consent.7' Chicago & North Western
refused to bargain with the unions because management believed that the
termination of those jobs was not a dispute to which the RLA applied.7 1
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the dispute was a labor dis62. Id. § 160.
63. See generally Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 378 (1969) (determining that once the RLA's bargaining procedures have been exhausted,
labor unions may strike).
64. 45 U.S.C. § 156.
65. Donald R. Richberg, Counsel for the Organized Railway Employees.
66. 67 CONG. REc. 4588 (1926); Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 93-94 (1926).
67. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
68. Id. at 335-36.
69. Id. at 332.
70. Id
71. Id. at 332-33.
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pute covered by the RLA,72 which barred the district court from issuing an
injunction against the strike.
The Supreme Court's decision in Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v.
United Transportation Union a further clarified the term "working conditions." The Shore Line Court determined that the RLA's status quo provision applied to working conditions existing at the time the labor dispute
arose, regardless of whether those conditions were covered by an existing
collective bargaining agreement." 4 In Shore Line, the Court held that the
status quo provision applied to the railroad's decision to establish work assignments away from the principal railroad yard.7 5 The Court asserted that
the provision was triggered even though there was no prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement against work assignments outside of the railroad's principal yard."6
The Shore Line Court also determined that conditions described in collective bargaining agreements are "working conditions" subject to the RLA's
status quo provision.7 7 The status quo provision, however, is not limited to
those conditions embodied in the agreements.'
The Court in Shore Line
focused on the purpose of the status quo provision. The Court concluded
that the policies behind the provision would not be served if the provision
were not applied to all conditions existing at the time of the dispute, regardless of whether an existing collective bargaining agreement covered those
conditions.79
72. Id. at 335, 342. The Supreme Court determined that a labor dispute existed as defined
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court recognized that once the unions filed the section

156 notice contesting the abolishment of positions, the RLA's bargaining provisions were im-

plemented. Id. at 335-39; see supra note 5 (citing to Norris-LaGuardia Act). The Court's
analysis focused on the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prevents district courts from granting
injunctions to end labor strikes. 362 U.S. at 334-35. The Supreme Court concluded that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act barred the district court from issuing an injunction against the strike

where the dispute involved a major change affecting jobs under an existing collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 341-42.
73. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
74. Id. at 152-53. The status quo provision "extends to those actual, objective working

conditions out of which the dispute arose." Id at 153.
75. Id. at 154.
76. Id. The Court reasoned that "where a condition is [satisfactory] to both sides, it is
often omitted from the agreement." Id. at 155.

77. Id. at 153.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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MANAGEMENT'S PREROGATIVE TO Go OUT OF BUSINESS:
APPLICATION TO THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY

A.

Applying Management's Prerogative to Go Out of Business to the

Railroad Industry
In labor disputes involving employees protected under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), the Supreme Court has ruled that management has
the prerogative to go out of business80 without triggering the bargaining provisions of the NLRA. 1 The Supreme Court has never applied this management prerogative to employees protected by the RLA. Nevertheless, the

Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.82
concluded that analogies may be drawn from the NLRA to the RLA to
determine the rights of railroad employees.8 3
Trainmen involved a dispute arising under the RLA's status quo provision. 4 In Trainmen, the Florida East Coast Railway and the labor union
representing Florida East Coast's employees had exhausted the RLA's bar-

gaining procedures, yet failed to reach an agreement regarding the proposed
change in working conditions.

5

Florida East Coast, however, implemented

changes.8 6

the
The workers then went on strike, picketing Florida East
Coast and conducting a secondary picket against businesses providing services to the railroad. 7 The secondary picket attempted to force businesses to
80. See generally First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (concluding that an employer has the right to close down part of his business "purely for economic
reasons" without having to negotiate with the unions); Textile Workers Union of America v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) (holding that an employer "has the absolute
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, but ... such right [does not
include] the ability to close part of a business no matter what the reason") (emphasis added).
81. In determining that an employer has the prerogative to go out of business without first
bargaining with the unions, the Supreme Court stated:
Some management decisions, such as choice of advertising and promotion, product
type and design, and financing arrangements, have only an indirect and attenuated
impact on the employment relationship. Other management decisions, such as order
of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules, are almost
exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and employee ....
[A]
third type of management decision ... [has] a direct impact on employment... [and
has] as its focus only the economic profitability of the [business].
First National, 452 U.S. at 676-77 (citations omitted) (quoting Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)).
82. 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
83. Id. at 377.
84. Id. at 371.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id. at 371-74.
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discontinue working with Florida East Coast."8 Florida East Coast obtained
an injunction from the state court prohibiting the secondary picketing. The
Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide the states power to regulate secondary conduct 8 9
In deciding Trainmen, the Supreme Court first established the applicability of federal law.' The Court then analyzed the statutory provisions of the
RLA and determined that neither the Act nor the courts had developed any
meaningful standards for determining whether secondary picketing was protected conduct. 91 Therefore, the Court used case law developed under the
NLRA and examined the policies behind the Act to conclude that secondary
picketing was a protected activity. 92 The Court, however, refused to import
the whole context of labor law developed under the NLRA into the railway

labor arena. 93 Thus, the issue of when to apply law developed under the
NLRA to a dispute arising under the RLA remains unsettled.
B.

The Court'sJustificationsfor Management'sPrerogative to Go Out of

Business under the NLRA
In disputes arising under the NLRA, the Supreme Court has allowed employers to go out of business without imposing the duty to bargain with the
unions over the decision. The Court has justified these decisions by recognizing management's prerogative to cease business operations. In Textile
88. Id. During the strike the employees picketed various locations where Florida East
Coast conducted business, including the Jacksonville terminal. Id. at 371. Employees at the
Jacksonville terminal provided various services to Florida East Coast including switching, signalling, track maintenance and repairs on the railroad's cars and engines. Id. at 373. The
picketers at the Jacksonville terminal picketed almost all entrances to the terminal, not just the
terminal reserved for Florida East Coast's employees. Id. at 374. These picketers urged Jacksonville's employees not to cross the picket line. Id.
89. Id. at 372. A secondary boycott affects a third party who is not involved in the labor
dispute. Id. at 388. At the Jacksonville terminal's request, the circuit court granted an injunction to stop the picketing at all terminal entrances except where Florida East Coast specifically
conducted business. Id. at 374-75. The basis for the injunction was a state law which prohibited secondary boycotts. Id.
90. Id. at 380-82. The Court determined that the "exercise of plenary state authority to
curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate, effective implementation of the [RLA's]
processes." Id. at 380.
91. Id. at 382-87.
92. Id. at 384-90. The standard that the Court used was whether the secondary boycott
was "within the general penumbra of conduct held protected under [the NLRA] or whether it
[was] beyond the pale of any activity thought permissible." Id. at 384. The Court concluded
that "if Congress should now find that abuses in the nature of secondary activities have arisen
in the railroad industry, it might well decide.., that this field requires extraordinary treatment
of some sort." Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 383.
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Workers Union of America v. Darlington,94 the Supreme Court ruled that an
employer had the right to terminate his business for any reason, provided

that the employer was not transferring his work to another plant or opening
a new plant to replace the closed plant. 95 Darlington involved a family-

owned business that operated several textile mills, including the Darlington
mill. 96 When the employees of the Darlington mill voted to unionize, the
employer closed the mill claiming that the union's demands for higher wages
would make it impossible for the mill to operate competitively.9 7 Once the

mill was closed, operations at the plant ceased and the employer sold the
capital assets.9 8 The employer did not seek to reopen the mill with nonunion
employees.9 9 The Darlington Court recognized that the employer's decision
to close down its business terminated the employer-employee relationship." °o
Therefore, the Court held that the employer did not have a duty to bargain
10 1
with the employees' union about the closing.
The Court's decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,10 2
reaffirmed management's prerogative to go out of business. In First National, the Court held that an employer's right to close its business for economic reasons outweighed any benefit that might be gained by allowing the
unions to bargain with the employer regarding the decision to close down. 103
FirstNational involved a company that contracted with a nursing home to
provide housekeeping and maintenance services." 4 When the nursing home
94. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
95. Id. at 272-74. The Court further stated that "[a] proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or
unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act." Id. at 270.
96. Id. at 265.
97. Id. at 266. The president of Darlington testified that all hopes of achieving competitive costs and taking full advantage of the new machinery that had just been installed diminished when the employees unionized. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 272-73.
100. Id. at 274. The Court stated that the "closing of an entire business, even though
discriminatory [based on anti-union animus], ends the employer-employee relationship." Id.
101. Id. The Court clarified its position stating that "[n]othing we have said in this opinion
would justify an employer's interfering with employee organizational activities by threatening
to close his plant, as distinguished from announcing a decision to close already reached by the
board of directors or other management authority empowered to make such a decision." Id. at
274 n.20.
102. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
103. Id. at 686. The Court articulated a balancing test stating "that the harm likely to be
done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its
business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in making the decision." Id.
104. Id. at 668.
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reduced the weekly fee paid to First National for its services, the company
began losing money on the contract."0 5 Consequently, First National notified the nursing home that unless the home reinstated the original fee, the
company would cease operations at the home." ° Two weeks before First
National ceased working at the nursing home, the employees' union notified
First National that the company had a duty to bargain with the union over
management's decision to go out of business.10 7 Management, however,
failed to bargain with the union before discontinuing performance on the
nursing home contract.10 8 The union then filed an unfair labor practice
claim against First National." °9
In holding that First National did not have to bargain with the employees'
union before going out of business, the Supreme Court announced a balancing test for determining when management must bargain with the unions
over the decision to shut down part of its business.'1 0 In determining
whether to impose the duty to bargain, this test looks at the harm likely to
be done to the employer and weighs it against the benefit to the employees
and the collective bargaining process."' One commentator believes that the
FirstNational Court did not impose bargaining in closing situations because
the Court feared that the unions would use bargaining as a tool to delay
management decisions and to prevent management from realizing its legiti12
mate business objectives."
The Court's decisions in FirstNational and Darlingtonindicate that management should be free from bargaining constraints when making decisions
regarding a company's continued existence. Both of these decisions, however, involve the application of management's prerogative to go out of business within the context of the NLRA. As the Court noted in Trainmen,
decisions under the NLRA cannot be applied wholesale to controversies
105. Id. at 668-69.
106. Id. at 669.
107. Id.

108. Id. at 670.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 686; see supra note 103. This test requires bargaining over management decisions that have a "substantial impact on the continued availability of employment" if the benefit to labor "outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." 452 U.S. at 679.
111. 452 U.S. at 686. In balancing these interests, the Court examines an employer's need
for unencumbered decisionmaking, his desire to cut labor costs and whether there was a capital investment and weighs these factors against the effect of the company's decision on its
employees. Id. at 679-80.
112. Irving, Closing and Sales of Businesses: A Settled Area?, 33 LAB. L.J. 218, 222 (1982).
By imposing bargaining in closing situations, the unions could prevent a company from going
out of business or make it so costly for a company to go out of business that it would be forced
into bankruptcy. Id. The NLRB has tried to limit the decision in First National to its facts.
Id. at 226.
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arising under the RLA. "3 Thus, special concerns must be addressed before
railroad management can freely exercise its prerogative to go out of business.
In particular, railroad employees have historically been accorded special
treatment under the RLA because of the need for free flowing interstate
14
commerce. 1
The Staggers Act exemption amendments created a new regulatory environment for the railroad industry. These amendments eliminated the need
for companies acquiring rail lines to obtain Commission approval and made
the railroad industry more economically competitive with other modes of
transportation. The Supreme Court, in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association, considered whether management's
prerogative to go out of business should be recognized in the modern railroad industry.
III. PITTSBURGH & LAKE ERIE RAILROAD V. RAILWAY LABOR
EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION-THE
THE RIGHT TO

Go

DUTY TO BARGAIN VERSUS

OUT OF BUSINESS

In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroadv. Railway Labor Executives' Association, "5 the Supreme Court analyzed whether railroad management should
have the prerogative to go out of business. The dispute in Pittsburgh& Lake
Erie arose when P&LE decided to sell its assets and go out of business after
operating at a loss for five years." 6 P&LE sold its track and trackage rights
to the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Rail Company (Railco)." 7 Railco decided
to decline the collective bargaining contracts that P&LE had with the unions
and to reduce the work force by 500 employees."' When P&LE's unions
were notified of the impending sale, the unions asserted that the sale was
subject to the RLA's bargaining provisions." 9 P&LE's unions argued that
the RLA's provisions governed because the sale affected the job security of
113. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text (discussing the general provisions of the

RLA).
115. 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989).
116. Id. at 2588. Prior to the sale, P&LE had attempted to improve the railroad's financial
condition by reducing the work force, making concessions with its employees, and attempting
market expansion. Id. These efforts to improve the railroad's financial condition failed. Id.

The reasons for P&LE's losses included: The reduction in railroad regulation which favored
the major railroads; the closing of rail shippers, such as steel mills, on P&LE's lines; and
increased competition from trucking companies. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (Nos. 87-1589 and 87-

1888).
117. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2588.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 50-63.
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500 employees.' 2 P&LE, however, refused to bargain with the unions over
the effects of the sale because P&LE believed that the transaction was within
the Commission's jurisdiction and governed by the ICA's exemption
procedure. 121
Pursuant to the RLA, the unions filed section 156 notices proposing
changes to the existing collective bargaining contracts which would lessen
the adverse impact of the sale on P&LE's employees. 22 P&LE again declined to bargain with the unions.' 2 3 The Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA), on behalf of P&LE's unions, then filed suit against the
railroad in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.' 24 The RLEA sought both a declaratory judgment to determine
P&LE's bargaining obligations under the RLA, and an injunction against
the sale of the railroad until P&LE fulfilled its duty to bargain. 2 In addition, the unions went on strike, protesting P&LE's refusal to bargain over
the effects of the sale.126 P&LE filed for a restraining order against the
strike, which was subsequently denied by the district court.' 27 Railco, a
noncarrier, then filed a notice of exemption with the Commission to exempt
it from the formal approval provisions of the ICA.' 28 The exemption became effective almost immediately. 129 The Commission allowed the exemption to become effective despite the unions' request for revocation. 3 ° P&LE
then reapplied to the district court for a temporary restraining order against
the strike.' 3 ' This time, the district court granted P&LE's request for a restraining order. 132 The district court held that once the Commission had
approved the sale, P&LE no longer had any bargaining obligations under the
33
RLA. 1
The unions appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which summarily reversed and remanded the case to the district
120. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2588.
121. Id. at 2589.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2589-90.
124. Id. at 2590.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The district court denied P&LE's request for a restraining order against the strike
on grounds that the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbade it from exercising its power in a labor
dispute. Id.
128. Id.at 2591.
129. Id.; see supra note 42.
130. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2591. The unions did not seek labor protective
provisions pursuant to the Commission's authority under section 10901. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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court.134 On remand, the district court was instructed to consider whether
either the sale of P&LE or the labor strike violated the RLA. 135 The district
court determined that although P&LE did not have a duty to bargain about
the decision to sell, the RLA required P&LE to bargain with the unions over
the effects of the sale on the employees. 136 Furthermore, the district court
found that the safe was incomplete until P&LE met this bargaining obligation.137 The Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's decision
regarding P&LE's duty to bargain with the unions. 138 The United States
sale of
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether to stay the 139
obligations.
bargaining
RLA's
the
fulfilled
railroad
P&LE until the
The Court's analysis in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie sought to give effect to the
provisions of the ICA and the RLA. 1"' Although the Court's conclusions
complied with the provisions and purposes of the ICA, the decision failed to
implement fully the RLA's provisions.14 1 Implicit in the Court's analysis
was the realization that if the Court strictly followed the RLA's provisions,
142
it would not carry out the purposes underlying the ICA amendments.
Therefore, P&LE and other insolvent railroads would be prevented from going out of business. 143 If these railroads are required to bargain with labor
unions before going out of business, railroads will be unable to compete with
other modes of transportation whose employees fall within the NLRA because the NLRA does not impose a similar duty to bargain.1
A.

The Majority Opinion: DeregulatingEmployment Relationships

The majority opinion, written by Justice White, analyzed the RLA's status quo provision to determine whether that provision required P&LE to
issue section 156 notices to the unions apprising them of the sale.' 45 Justice
White determined that P&LE had no such duty because there was no express or implied agreement between P&LE and the unions prohibiting
P&LE from going out of business or selling its assets. Moreover, there was
134. Id at 2592.
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id
139. 488 U.S. 965 (1988).
140. 109 S. Ct. at 2596.
141. Id. at 2597.
142. These amendments were enacted to create a more competitive and profitable railroad
industry. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text (discussing the confrontation between
the RLA and the ICA).
144. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
145. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2592-93.
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no agreement requiring P&LE to provide labor protections if it did go out of
business or sell its assets. 146 Justice White then considered whether the status quo provision required P&LE to bargain regarding the effects of the sale
on the employees."4 Again, he relied on the fact that no express or implied
agreement existed between P&LE and the unions requiring management to
provide labor protections if it went out of business.' 4 ' He concluded that
there was neither a basis for requiring P&LE to issue a section 156 notice to
the unions informing them of the proposed sale, nor a reason for imposing
bargaining obligations on management.' 4 9
Justice White then rejected the RLEA's argument that the working conditions subject to the status quo provision were those existing at the time the
unions filed their section 156 notice.'5 0 The RLEA asserted that, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Shore Line, the working conditions existing at
the time the unions issued their section 156 notice included the relationship
of employer-employee and the state of being employed.' 5 ' In rejecting the
RLEA's argument, Justice White narrowed the effectiveness of the Court's
decision in Shore Line. Specifically, Justice White stated that the Shore Line
decision extended the language of section 156 to the "outer limits," and that
Shore Line should not apply indiscriminately to all situations involving railway labor disputes.' 5 2 He also distinguished the decision in Shore Line, on
the basis that Shore Line did not involve a railroad's decision to sell its assets
Rather, Justice White noted that the
and cease operations as a railroad.'
practice at issue in Shore Line was a working condition subject to the RLA's
status quo provision because it had been an "unquestioned practice for many
54
years."1
146. Id. at 2593. P&LE was proposing to cease operations as a railroad employer. Id. The
Supreme Court noted that the RLEA did not explain how P&LE's decision to go out of business would violate the collective bargaining agreements or require changing those agreements.

Id.
147. Id. at 2592.
148. Id. at 2592-93. Justice White relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in Shore Line to define
how implied agreements between a railroad and its unions may arise. Quoting from Shore
Line, Justice White acknowledged that within the " 'context of the relationship between the
principals, taken as a whole, there [may be] a basis for implying an understanding on the
particular practice involved.'" Id. at 2593 (quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v.
United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 160 (1969)).
149. Id. at 2593.
150. Id. at 2593-94.
151. Id. at 2593.
152. Id. at 2594.
153. Id.
154. Id. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Shore Line).
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Once Justice White concluded that the Shore Line analysis was inapplicable to the facts of Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, he turned to the Supreme Court's
decisions in Darlingtonand FirstNational. Reasoning from those cases, Justice White determined that management's prerogative to go out of business
should be recognized in the railroad industry absent statutory direction to
the contrary.1 55 Using the principles developed in Darlington and FirstNational,156 Justice White determined that a railroad's decision to go out of
business was not a change in the status quo protected by the RLA.1 57 By
going out of business, Justice White concluded, P&LE would no longer be a
railroad employer and, therefore, would have no duties under the RLA. 158
Justice White completed his analysis of P&LE's duty to bargain with the
unions by focusing on the relationship between the RLA and the ICA. He
determined that while the ICA required Railco to satisfy the exemption requirements, nothing in either the ICA or the RLA prevented P&LE from
completing the sale immediately.1 59 Thus, Justice White concluded that the
Commission had, in effect, approved the sale of P&LE by allowing the exemption filed by Railco to become effective."W
In analyzing the ICA within the context of the P&LE sale, Justice White
sought to avoid interpreting the ICA in a way that would conflict with the
RLA. 16 ' He stated that the Court's policy, when confronted with two potentially conflicting federal statutes, was to "'give effect to each if [possible]
155. Pittsburgh& Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2595-96; see supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text (examining the development of management's prerogative to go out of business developed under the NLRA).
156. See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text. The Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Court
recognized management's prerogative to go out of business, stating:

[T]he decision to close down a business entirely is so much a management prerogative that only an unmistakable expression of congressional intent will suffice to require the employer to postpone a sale of its assets pending the fulfillment of any duty
it may have to bargain over the subject matter of union notices such as were served in

this case.
109 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
157. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2596. Justice White declared that "[a]bsent
statutory direction to the contrary, the decision of a railroad employer to go out of business
and consequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs is not a change in the conditions of employment forbidden by the status quo provision of § 156." Id.
158. Id. Justice White stated that "where the agreement is silent on the matter and the

railroad employer has proceeded in accordance with the ICA... there is little or no basis for
the unions to expect that a § 156 notice would be effective to delay the company's departure
from the railroad business." Id.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Id.
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while preserving their sense and purpose.' "162 Yet, by not imposing labor
protections on P&LE, Justice White gave effect to the sense and purpose of
the ICA amendments, but failed to implement fully the sense and purpose of
the RLA.
Although Justice White held that P&LE did not have a duty to serve
section 156 notices on the unions, he concluded that P&LE did have a limited duty to bargain, at least to the extent that P&LE could satisfy the unions' demands concerning the effects of the sale on the employees. 163 Justice
White noted that at the time the unions' section 156 notices were served,
P&LE's decision to sell, and the terms of the sales agreement between P&LE
and Railco, were settled.'
Justice White concluded that P&LE was under
no obligation to bargain about the previously negotiated terms.165 Accordingly, Justice White asserted that P&LE was only required to bargain about
those issues which P&LE, itself, could satisfy.' 66 Under Justice White's
analysis, the bargaining obligation existed until the exemption, filed with the
167
Commission, became effective.
B.

The Dissent: Advocating the Continued Regulation of the Railroad

68
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie,
adopted a historical approach in his analysis of P&LE's duty to bargain with
the labor unions over the railroad's decision to go out of business. He focused initially on the railroad industry's regulated past, discussing the enactment of ICA and the establishment of the Commission. Justice Stevens then
addressed the subsequent regulation of railroad employment relationships
under the RLA.' 69 He noted that for sixty years after the adoption of the

162. Id. (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)). The Court further stated that
it is "not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
163. Id. at 2597.
164. Id.
165. Id. The unions could not "change or dictate the terms of the sale" or challenge the
decision to sell because these terms had already been negotiated. Id
166. Id. at 2597. P&LE's duty to bargain about the effects of the sale existed only with
regard to the facts existing at the time the unions' section 156 notices were served. Id. at 2597
n.19. The Court did not address the issue of whether a railroad employer has a duty to bargain
with a union in response to the union's section 156 notice "proposing labor protection provisions in the event that a sale, not yet contemplated, should take place." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2599 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the majority's decision
only with respect to the railroad's duty to bargain with its employees under the RLA. Id. at
2603.
169. Id. at 2599.
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RLA, when railroad management sought to terminate its relationship with
the employees, management had to complete a protracted process to obtain
the Commission's approval.170 Moreover, approval of the sale was frequently conditioned on the railroad's acceptance of job protection or sever1 71
ance pay for all affected employees.
Justice Stevens acknowledged that after the Commission announced that
labor protections would no longer be imposed on employers during the sale
of shortline railroads, 172 collective bargaining agreements became the tool
unions used to obtain labor protection provisions. 173 Whereas employment
contracts are altered by renegotiation, Justice Stevens stated that rail labor
agreements are generally altered only by notification under section 156 of the
RLA. 174 Thus, he determined that P&LE's unions were reasonable in seeking to amend the collective bargaining agreements to include labor protec17 5
tion provisions once P&LE's plans to sell the railroad became known.
Unlike Justice White, Justice Stevens believed that once the unions sought
labor protection provisions, P&LE had a duty to maintain the status quo
176
until the dispute was resolved.
In supporting the contention that P&LE had a duty to bargain with the
unions over the effects of the sale, Justice Stevens relied on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Railroad Telegraphers177 and Shore Line.178 Justice Stevens utilized Railroad Telegraphers to illustrate that "job security is a
proper subject for bargaining under the RLA."'179 His analysis did not distinguish between a partial abandonment of a rail station and a sale of a railroad because, in both instances, employees lost their jobs.'8 0
Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justice White's refusal to apply Shore
Line to the facts of Pittsburgh and Lake Erie.18 1 Justice Stevens declared it
reasonable for the railroad employees' jobs to be included among the work170. Id.; see supra note 39 (discussing the prior approval process under the ICA).
171. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2599 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2600; see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Staggers Act
exemption amendments to the ICA).
173. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id. at 2601; see supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing the court's decision in Railroad Telegraphers).
178. Pittsburgh& Lake Erie, 109 S.Ct. at 2601 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 7379 and accompanying text (discussing the Shore Line analysis).
179. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S.Ct. at 2601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2602.
181. Id. at 2601-02; see supra text accompanying notes 150-54 (examining Justice White's
refusal to apply the Shore Line analysis in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie).
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ing conditions triggering the RLA's status quo provision. 18 2 Moreover, Justice Stevens believed that Shore Line controlled the decision in Pittsburgh
and Lake Erie because both disputes arose out of changes in established procedure.11 3 He also noted that the Court's decision in Shore Line rejected the
idea that the term "working conditions" applied only to those conditions
expressly included in collective bargaining contracts. 18 4 Therefore, Justice
Stevens declared that the RLA commanded P&LE to bargain with the unions regarding the effects of the sale.' 8 5 Justice Stevens summarily dismissed
the application of the Court's decisions in Darlington and FirstNational to
the facts of Pittsburgh & Lake Erie because both Darlington and First National involved unregulated industries.' 6
The Court's decision in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie highlights the tension between the ICA and the RLA. The majority's decision subordinated the
RLA's status quo provisions to the ICA's exemption provisions and, as a
consequence, permitted railroad management the prerogative to go out of
business.' 8 7 Conversely, the dissent maintained that the RLA bargaining
provisions controlled and, therefore, management prerogative to go out of
business had no place in the railroad industry. As the majority and dissenting opinions illustrate, whether railroad management possesses the prerogative to go out of business depends on which statute controls when a railroad
decides to terminate its operations.

IV. THE HIDDEN TENSION BETWEEN THE ICA AND THE RLA
A.

Balancing the Interests of Labor and Management-Management's
Prerogative to Go Out of Business Prevails

The majority's decision in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie is significant because it
permits railroad management the prerogative to terminate business operations.' 88 The majority's decision recognized that the railroad industry is a
competitive business. The majority concluded that the railroad industry
should not be subject to extensive regulation which might stifle railroad
management's ability to make prudent business decisions.
The majority's decision, however, failed to recognize that its analysis gave
priority to the ICA over the RLA. The majority analyzed the facts giving
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
d at 2602.
Id at 2601.
Id. at 2602.
Id. at 2602-03.
187. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's opinion in
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Pittsburgh & Lake Erie).

188. See supra text accompanying notes 145-67.
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rise to the dispute in light of the ICA exemption provisions and the purposes
behind those provisions. In contrast to the majority's in depth examination
of the ICA, the majority never analyzed the dispute in terms of the RLA's
purposes.' 89 The majority focused only on the RLA's status quo and bargaining provisions.190 As a result, the majority failed to reconcile the ICA
exemption amendments with the RLA's statutory provisions.
Congress enacted the 1980 ICA amendments to "streamlin[e] procedures
to effectuate economically efficient transactions."' 91 In 1926, however,
when Congress passed the RLA, it had different concerns. The RLA was
passed to promote collective bargaining in the railroad industry, and to
avoid unnecessary strikes and interruptions in interstate commerce.1 9 2
Although by their terms these statutes do not conflict, occasionally their
purposes have been incompatible. For example, as the dissent noted in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Court had previously determined that job security is
193
a condition triggering the RLA's status quo provisions.
Moreover, the RLA specifically states that wages' 94 are a working condition to which the RLA's status quo provision applies. Logically, a reduction
in the job force will result in reduced wages for those affected employees.
Consequently, it is likely that railroad management's failure to bargain with
the employees' unions over changes in employment status could result in
strikes and subsequent interruptions in interstate commerce. Therefore, the
Court's recognition, in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, of railroad management's
prerogative to go out of business, without requiring management to bargain
with the unions, could induce railway labor unions to use strikes as a means
to defeat management's decision to sell.
This possible consequence of Pittsburgh & Lake Erie runs afoul of the
purposes behind the RLA bargaining provisions. If continued employment
had been interpreted in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie as a working condition trig189. Id
190. See supra notes 161-167 and
tion of the RLA and the ICA).

accompanying text (discussing the majority's reconcilia-

191. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584,
2597 (1988); see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (examining the ICA's exemption
amendments).
192. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148 (1969); see
supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text (discussing the RLA).
193. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 336 (1960). The
Telegraphers Court disagreed with the court of appeals' findings that the unions' efforts to
negotiate job security was" 'an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its
operations.'" Id. (quoting Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254,
259 (7th Cir. 1959)).
194. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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gering the RLA's status quo provision, 9 5 then P&LE would have been obligated to serve section 156 notices on the unions and to bargain about the
effects of the sale.' 9 6 Although this result would have satisfied the RLA's
statutory provisions as well as the RLA's purposes, it would have ignored
the purposes underlying the ICA exemption amendments.' 97 If railroad
management were required to bargain regarding the decision to sell, even in
the absence of an agreement between management and the unions requiring
bargaining, then the time-consuming negotiating process might destroy the
only chance that an insolvent railroad has for survival.' 98
The majority's decision promotes the financial viability of the railroad industry by allowing management a limited prerogative to go out of business.19 9 By not imposing the RLA's bargaining provisions on P&LE,
however, the majority decided which statute should govern. That decision is
one more appropriately left to the legislature.
In contrast, the dissent followed the preamendment decisions in Railroad
2o and
Telegraphers and Shore Line,"
ignored the primary goals of the ICA
20
1
exemption amendments.
Moreover, the dissent failed to perceive management's need for flexibility when making decisions regarding the railroad's
continued existence. Consequently, the dissent refused to recognize the concept of a management prerogative to cease business in the railroad
industry.2 °2
B. Finding the Balance: A CongressionalDecision
In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Court was forced to resolve an issue based
on the RLA, a statute enacted in 1926, when the railroad industry was very
different from the current industry. When the RLA was enacted, the railroad was important to the nation's economy both as the predominant mode
of interstate transportation and as a significant component of national de195. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text (discussing the RLA's status quo

provision).
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.

198. Pittsburgh& Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2602 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the court of
appeals' findings).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58 (focusing on the majority's application of
Darlington and First National to the facts of Pittsburgh & Lake Erie).
200. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text (examining the decisions in Railroad
Telegraphers and Shore Line).
201. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
202. The dissent views the railroad industry as heavily regulated and, therefore, sees no
role for management prerogative. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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fense. 20 3 Therefore, any interruption in the operation of the railroads was
viewed with trepidation because of the possible effects on the nation's economy and security. 2°
The contemporary railroad industry, however, must compete with other
transportation industries such as trucking, barge, and airline. 20 A labor
strike by railroad employees today would not have the paralyzing effect on
the nation's economy that such a strike would have had in 1926, when other
modes of transportation were not yet economically efficient. Moreover, because other types of deregulated and unregulated transportation exist, the
management of these competing industries can make business decisions
without the encumbrances regulation imposes. Consequently, for railroads
to be competitive, railroad management must be able to make economically
efficient decisions, or else be forced out of business. The ICA exemption
amendments were designed to create an efficient, economically competitive
railroad industry. 2°6 The achievement of the goals behind the ICA exemption amendments, however, are impeded by the RLA which imposes bargaining obligations whenever railroad management attempts to change the
employees' rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
The Court's decision in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie illuminates the historical
limitations inherent in the RLA. In particular, the Court's decision highlights the need for Congress to update the provisions of the RLA in light of
the recent amendments to the ICA. Perhaps the RLA could be updated to
resemble the NLRA. Until Congress acts, courts are destined to interpret
the RLA and the ICA in an inconsistent manner, determining for themselves which provisions and which policies should apply.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ICA exemption amendments enacted in 1980 have restructured the
railroad industry by decreasing the extent of regulation over railroad acquisitions. The ICA no longer requires the Commission to impose labor protections in transactions involving the acquisition of a railroad. The RLA's
status quo provisions impose a duty on railroad management to bargain with
respect to labor protections once a section 156 notice is filed. This provision
offsets the ICA's liberal stance toward labor protections in acquisitions. The
Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the tension between the ICA's exemption provisions and the RLA's bargaining provisions in Pittsburgh & Lake
203. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text.

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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Erie. The Court in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie gave priority to the purposes
underlying the ICA's exemption amendments over the purposes behind the
RLA.
The decision in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie focused on whether a railroad
employer that is selling its assets and going out of business must bargain
with the unions regarding either the decision to sell or the effects of the sale.
The Supreme Court determined that, absent an agreement to the contrary,
the employer had no duty to bargain with the unions over the decision to
sell. To reach this result, the Court applied the concept of management prerogative to the railroad employer's decision to go out of business. The
Court, however, concluded that the employer had a limited duty to bargain
with the unions over the effects of the sale. This limited duty existed only
with respect to those union demands that the railroad employer could satisfy
and lasted only until the exemption became effective.
The Court's decision in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, continued the trend toward deregulation of the railroad industry. Today, absent an express or implied agreement to the contrary, a railroad employer does not have a duty to
bargain with union employees when going out of business.2 "7 The continued
regulation of employment relationships, however, hampers the railroad employer's ability to operate competitively. Congress has maintained the RLA
since 1926, presumably intending to ensure some protection to railroad labor. Yet, the adoption of the ICA amendments indicates that Congress has
realized that the imposition of labor protections in certain situations is costly
and burdensome to the railroad industry. Whether railroad labor should
continue to be regulated by the RLA in light of the ICA amendments is a
question Congress must confront.
Carol Moors Toth

207. But see Brandywine Valley R.R.-Purchase CSX Transp. Inc., 5 I.C.C. 2d 764, 77071 (1989) (sale and lease transaction between two carriers under section 11343 of the ICA is
subject to labor protection provisions).

